Gilbert Ryle was one of the most important and controversial philosophers of the Twentieth century. Long unavailable, Critical Essays: Collected Papers Volume 1 includes many of Ryle s most important and thought-provoking papers.

This volume contains 20 critical essays on the history of philosophy, with writing on Plato, Locke and Hume as well as important chapters on Russell and Wittgenstein. It also includes three essays on phenomenology, including Ryle s famous review of Martin Heidegger s Being and Time first published in 1928. Although Ryle believed phenomenology will end in self-ruinous subjectivism or in a windy mysticism his review also acknowledged that Heidegger was a thinker of great originality and importance.

While surveying the developments in the philosophy of language and philosophical logic, Ryle sets out his own conception of the philosophers role against that of his predecessors and contemporaries.

Together with the second volume of Ryle s collected papers Collected Papers Volume 2 and the new edition of The Concept of Mind, all published by Routledge, these outstanding essays represent the very best of Ryle s work. Each volume contains a substantial introduction by Julia Tanney, and both are essential reading for any student of twentieth-century philosophies of mind and language.

Gilbert Ryle (1900 -1976) was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics and Fellow of Magdalen College Oxford, an editor of Mind, and a president of the Aristotelian Society.

Julia Tanney is Senior Lecturer at the University of Kent, and has held visiting positions at the University of Picardie and Paris-Sorbonne.

Gilbert Ryle was one of the most important and controversial philosophers of the Twentieth century. Long unavailable, Critical Essays: Collected Papers Volume 1 includes many of Ryle's most important and thought-provoking papers. This volume contains 20 critical essays on the history of philosophy, with writing on Plato, Locke and Hume as well as important chapters on Russell and Wittgenstein. It also includes three essays on phenomenology, including Ryle's famous review of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time first published in 1928. Although Ryle believed phenomenology 'will end in self-ruinous subjectivism or in a windy mysticism' his review also acknowledged that Heidegger was a thinker of great originality and importance. While surveying the developments in the philosophy of language and philosophical logic, Ryle sets out his own conception of the philosophers' role against that of his predecessors and contemporaries. Together with the second volume of Ryle's collected papers Collected Papers Volume 2 and the new edition of The Concept of Mind, all published by Routledge, these outstanding essays represent the very best of Ryle's work. Each volume contains a substantial introduction by Julia Tanney, and both are essential reading for any student of twentieth-century philosophies of mind and language. Gilbert Ryle (1900 -1976) was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics and Fellow of Magdalen College Oxford, an editor of Mind, and a president of the Aristotelian Society. Julia Tanney is Senior Lecturer at the University of Kent, and has held visiting positions at the University of Picardie and Paris-Sorbonne.

Gilbert Ryle was one of the most important and yet misunderstood philosophers of the Twentieth Century. Long unavailable, Collected Essays 1929-1968: Collected Papers Volume 2 stands as testament to the astonishing breadth of Ryle s philosophical concerns.

This volume showcases Ryle s deep interest in the notion of thinking and contains many of his major pieces, including his classic essays Knowing How and Knowing That, Philosophical Arguments, Systematically Misleading Expressions, and A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking . He ranges over an astonishing number of topics, including feelings, pleasure, sensation, forgetting and concepts and in so doing hones his own philosophical stance, steering a careful path between behaviourism and Cartesianism.

Together with the Collected Papers Volume 1 and the new edition of The Concept of Mind, these outstanding essays represent the very best of Ryle s work. Each volume contains a substantial preface by Julia Tanney, and both are essential reading for any student of twentieth-century philosophies of mind and language.

Gilbert Ryle (1900 -1976) was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics and Fellow of Magdalen College Oxford, an editor of Mind, and a president of the Aristotelian Society.

Julia Tanney is Senior Lectuer at the University of Kent, and has held visiting positions at the University of Picardie and Paris-Sorbonne.

First published in 1949, Gilbert Rylea (TM)s The Concept of Mind is one of the classics of twentieth-century philosophy. Described by Ryle as a a ~sustained piece of analytical hatchet-worka (TM) on Cartesian dualism, The Concept of Mind is a radical and controversial attempt to jettison once and for all what Ryle called a ~the ghost in the machinea (TM): Descartesa (TM) argument that mind and body are two separate entities. This sixtieth anniversary edition includes a substantial commentary by Julia Tanney and is essential reading for new readers interested not only in the history of analytic philosophy but in its power to challenge major currents in philosophy of mind and language today.

Gilbert Ryle was one of the most important and yet misunderstood philosophers of the Twentieth Century. Long unavailable, Collected Essays 1929-1968: Collected Papers Volume 2 stands as testament to the astonishing breadth of Ryle's philosophical concerns. This volume showcases Ryle's deep interest in the notion of thinking and contains many of his major pieces, including his classic essays 'Knowing How and Knowing That', 'Philosophical Arguments', 'Systematically Misleading Expressions', and 'A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking'. He ranges over an astonishing number of topics, including feelings, pleasure, sensation, forgetting and concepts and in so doing hones his own philosophical stance, steering a careful path between behaviourism and Cartesianism. Together with the Collected Papers Volume 1 and the new edition of The Concept of Mind, these outstanding essays represent the very best of Ryle's work. Each volume contains a substantial preface by Julia Tanney, and both are essential reading for any student of twentieth-century philosophies of mind and language. Gilbert Ryle (1900 -1976) was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics and Fellow of Magdalen College Oxford, an editor of Mind, and a president of the Aristotelian Society. Julia Tanney is Senior Lectuer at the University of Kent, and has held visiting positions at the University of Picardie and Paris-Sorbonne.

This is, as from the author of The Concept of Mind it could scarcely fail to be, a bold and rollicking book. It is also one of the most important works about Plato to have appeared since the first volume of Sir Karl Popper's The Open Society. Whereas The Concept of Mind was a general offensive against Cartesian views of man, eschewing any precise references to particular sources, Plato's Progress deals with scholarly questions of datings and developments, showing and demanding familiarity with a wide literature. Yet Professor Ryle is still incapable as ever of the dry-as-dust.

Common sense tells me I can control my life to some extent; should I then, faced with a logical argument for fatalism, reject common sense? There seems to be no place in a physical theory of the universe for the sensory experiences of colours, taste and smells, yet I know I have these experiences. In this book, Gilbert Ryle explores the conflicts that arise in everyday life and shows that the either/or which such dilemmas seem to suggest is a false dilemma: one side of the dilemma does not deny what we know to be true on the other side. This classic book has been revived in a new series livery for twenty-first-century readers, featuring a specially commissioned preface written by Barry Stroud.

This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory," the Cartesians "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.

Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone!

If our bodies exist in space and time, subject to the laws of physics, our minds must be somehow hidden within them like strange immaterial 'Ghosts in the Machine'. Introspection may give us direct access to our own mental world, but we can never know much about other people's. Such views have been regarded as common sense since Descartes, argues Gilbert Ryle, but they are based on a disastrous 'category-mistake'. This epoch-making book cuts through confused thinking and forces us to re-examine many cherished ideas about knowledge, imagination, consciousness and the intellect. The result is a classic example of philosophy in action.

This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.

This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.

Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone!

Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone!

This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's official theory, the Cartesians myth of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.

Common sense tells me I can control my life to some extent; should I then, faced with a logical argument for fatalism, reject common sense? There seems to be no place in a physical theory of the universe for the sensory experiences of colours, taste and smells, yet I know I have these experiences. In this book, Gilbert Ryle explores the conflicts that arise in everyday life and shows that the either/or which such dilemmas seem to suggest is a false dilemma: one side of the dilemma does not deny what we know to be true on the other side. This classic book has been revived in a new series livery for twenty-first-century readers, featuring a specially commissioned preface written by Barry Stroud.

Si, apres tout, les logiciens, et meme les philosophes, peuvent dire des choses sensees, alors il est possible que certains logiciens, et meme des philosophes du passe, y compris d'un passe lointain, aient dit parfois, meme si certaines lumieres leur faisaient defaut, des choses sensees. Cet hommage mesure, rendu par Ryle au passe, donne ici lieu a une brillante fantaisie sur la vie de Platon ou les faits ne cessent de repondre aux raisons, comme dans un roman anglais. Mais le motif est tres serieux: la vie d'un philosophe devrait aller comme sa pensee, du plus obscur au plus clair. Las Dans l'itineraire de Platon les faits furent les plus forts. Il faut donc secouer l'image traditionnelle de sa vie et de sa philosophie et reprendre toute la chronologie des Dialogues. A sa maniere, Ryle nous offre une meditation sur les commencements de la philosophie.